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Abstract
Person re-identification (re-ID) is the task of matching
person images across camera views, which plays an im-
portant role in surveillance and security applications. In-
spired by great progress of deep learning, deep re-ID mod-
els began to be popular and gained state-of-the-art per-
formance. However, recent works found that deep neural
networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial examples,
posing potential threats to DNNs based applications. This
phenomenon throws a serious question about whether deep
re-ID based systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks.
In this paper, we take the first attempt to implement ro-
bust physical-world attacks against deep re-ID. We propose
a novel attack algorithm, called advPattern, for generating
adversarial patterns on clothes, which learns the variations
of image pairs across cameras to pull closer the image fea-
tures from the same camera, while pushing features from
different cameras farther. By wearing our crafted “invisible
cloak”, an adversary can evade person search, or imper-
sonate a target person to fool deep re-ID models in physical
world. We evaluate the effectiveness of our transformable
patterns on adversaries’ clothes with Market1501 and our
established PRCS dataset. The experimental results show
that the rank-1 accuracy of re-ID models for matching the
adversary decreases from 87.9% to 27.1% under Evading
Attack. Furthermore, the adversary can impersonate a tar-
get person with 47.1% rank-1 accuracy and 67.9% mAP
under Impersonation Attack. The results demonstrate that
deep re-ID systems are vulnerable to our physical attacks.
1. Introduction
∗ Person re-identification (re-ID) [9] is an image retrieval
problem that aims at matching a person of interest across
∗Qian Wang is the corresponding author.
∗This work was accepted by IEEE ICCV 2019.
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Figure 1. The illustration of Impersonation Attack on re-ID mod-
els. The adversary with the adversarial patterns lures re-ID models
into mismatching herself as the target person.
multiple non-overlapping camera views. It has been in-
creasingly popular in research area and has broad appli-
cations in video surveillance and security, such as search-
ing suspects and missing people [30], cross-camera pedes-
trian tracking [33], and activity analysis [20]. Recently, in-
spired by the success of deep learning in various vision tasks
[12, 14, 26, 27, 34, 35], deep neural networks (DNNs) based
re-ID models [1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 18, 29, 31, 32] started to become
a prevailing trend and have achieved state-of-the-art perfor-
mance. Existing deep re-ID methods usually solve re-ID as
a classification task [1, 18, 32], or a ranking task [4, 6, 7],
or both [5, 29].
Recent studies found that DNNs are vulnerable to adver-
sarial attack [3, 10, 13, 16, 17, 22, 24, 28]. These carefully
modified inputs generated by adding visually imperceptible
perturbations, called adversarial examples, can lure DNNs
into working in abnormal ways, which pose potential threats
to DNNs based applications, e.g., face recognition [25], au-
tonomous driving [8], and malware classification [11]. The
broad deployment of deep re-ID in security related systems
makes it critical to figure out whether such adversarial ex-
amples also exist on deep re-ID models. Serious conse-
quences will be brought if deep re-ID systems are proved to
be vulnerable to adversarial attacks, for example, a suspect
who utilizes this vulnerability can escape from the person
search of re-ID based surveillance systems.
To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to inves-
tigate robust physical-world attacks on deep re-ID. In this
paper, we propose a novel attack algorithm, called advPat-
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tern, to generate adversarially transformable patterns across
camera views that cause image mismatch in deep re-ID sys-
tems. An adversary cannot be correctly matched by deep re-
ID models by printing the adversarial pattern on his clothes,
like wearing an “invisible cloak”. We present two different
kinds of attacks in this paper: Evading Attack and Imper-
sonation Attack. The former can be viewed as an untargeted
attack that the adversary attempts to fool re-ID systems into
matching him as an arbitrary person except himself. The
latter is a targeted attack which goes further than Evading
Attack: the adversary seeks to lure re-ID systems into mis-
matching himself as a target person. Figure 1 gives an illus-
tration of Impersonation Attack on deep re-ID models.
The main challenge with generating adversarial patterns
is that how to cause deep re-ID systems to fail to correctly
match the adversary’s images across camera views with the
same pattern on clothes. Furthermore, the adversary might
be captured by re-ID systems in any position, but the ad-
versarial pattern generated specifically for one shooting po-
sition is difficult to remain effective in other varying posi-
tions. In addition, other challenges with physically realiz-
ing attacks also exist: (1) How to allow cameras to perceive
the adversarial patterns but avoid arousing suspicion of hu-
man supervisors? (2) How to make the generated adversar-
ial patterns survive in various physical conditions, such as
printing process, dynamic environments and shooting dis-
tortion of cameras?
To address these challenges, we propose advPattern that
formulates the problem of generating adversarial patterns
against deep re-ID models as an optimization problem of
minimizing the similarity scores of the adversary’s images
across camera views. The key idea behind advPattern is
to amplify the difference of person images across camera
views in the process of extracting features of images by re-
ID models. To achieve the scalability of adversarial pat-
terns, we approximate the distribution of viewing transfor-
mation with a multi-position sampling strategy. We further
improve adversarial patterns’ robustness by modeling phys-
ical dynamics (e.g., weather changes, shooting distortion),
to ensure them survive in physical-world scenario. Figure
2 shows an example of our physical-world attacks on deep
re-ID systems.
To demonstrate the effectiveness of advPattern, we first
establish a new dataset, PRCS, which consists of 10,800
cropped images of 30 identities, and then evaluate the attack
ability of adversarial patterns on two deep re-ID models us-
ing the PRCS dataset and the publicly available Market1501
dataset. We show that our adversarially transformable pat-
terns generated by advPattern achieve high success rates
under both Evading Attack and Impersonation Attack: the
rank-1 accuracy of re-ID models for matching the adver-
sary decreases from 87.9% to 27.1% under Evading Attack,
meanwhile the adversary can impersonate as a target per-
Figure 2. An example of Impersonation Attack in physical world.
Left: the digital adversarial pattern; Middle: the adversary wear-
ing a clothes with the physical adversarial pattern; Right: The tar-
get person randomly chosen from Market1501 dataset.
son with 47.1% rank-1 accuracy and 67.9% mAP under Im-
personation Attack. The results demonstrate that deep re-
ID models are indeed vulnerable to our proposed physical-
world attacks.
In summary, our main contributions are three-fold:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to im-
plement physical-world attacks on deep re-ID systems,
and reveal the vulnerability of deep re-ID modes.
• We design two different attacks, Evading Attack and
Impersonation Attack, and propose a novel attack al-
gorithm advPattern for generating adversarially trans-
formable patterns, to realize adversary mismatch and
target person impersonation, respectively.
• We evaluate our attacks with two state-of-the-art deep
re-ID models and demonstrate the effectiveness of the
generated patterns to attack deep re-ID in both digital
domain and physical world with high success rate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: we
review some related works in Section 2 and introduce the
system model in Section 3. In Section 4, we present the
attack methods for implementing physical-world attacks on
deep re-ID models. We evaluate the proposed attacks and
demonstrate the effectiveness of our generated patterns in
Section 5 and conclude with Section 6.
2. Related Work
Deep Re-ID Models. With the development of deep
learning and increasing volumes of available datasets, deep
re-ID models have been adopted to automatically learn bet-
ter feature representation and similarity metric [1, 4, 5, 6,
7, 18, 29, 31, 32], achieving state-of-the art performance.
Some methods treat re-ID as a classification issue: Li et
al. [18] proposed a filter pairing neural network to auto-
matically learn feature representation. Yi et al. [32] used
a siamese deep neural network to solve the re-ID problem.
Ahmed et al. [1] added a different matching layer to im-
prove original deep architectures. Xiao et al. [31] utilized
multi-class classification loss to train model with data from
multiple domains. Other approaches solve re-ID as a rank-
ing task: Ding et al. [7] trained the network with the pro-
posed triplet loss. Cheng et al. [6] introduced a new term to
the original triplet loss to improve model performance. Be-
sides, two recent works [5, 29] considered two tasks simul-
taneously and built networks to jointly learn representation
from classification loss and ranking loss during training.
Adversarial Examples. Szegedy et al. [28] discovered
that neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples.
Given a DNNs based classifier f(·) and an input x with
ground truth label y, an adversarial example x′ is generated
by adding small perturbations to x such that the classifier
makes a wrong prediction, as f(x′) 6= y, or f(x′) = y∗ for
a specific target y∗ 6= y. Existing attack methods generate
adversarial examples either by one-step methods, like the
Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [10], or by solving op-
timization problems iteratively, such as L-BFGS [28], Ba-
sic Iterative Methods(BIM) [15], DeepFool [22], and Car-
lini and Wagner Attacks(C&W) [3]. Kurakin et al. [15] ex-
plored adversarial attack in physical world by printing ad-
versarial examples on paper to cause misclassification when
photographed by cellphone camera. Sharif et al. [25] de-
signed eyeglass frame by printing adversarial perturbations
on it to attack face recognition systems. Evtimov et al. [8]
created adversarial road sign to attack road sign classifiers
under different physical conditions. Athalye et al. [2] con-
structed physical 3D-printed adversarial objects to fool a
classifier when photographed over a variety of viewpoints.
In this paper, to the best of our knowledge, we are
the first to investigate physical-world attacks on deep re-
ID models, which differs from prior works targeting on
classifiers as follows: (1) Existing works on classification
task failed to generate transformable patterns across cam-
era views against image retrieval problems. (2) Attacking
re-ID systems in physical world faces more complex physi-
cal conditions, for instance, adversarial patterns should sur-
vive in printing process, dynamic environments and shoot-
ing distortion under any camera views. These differences
make it impossible to directly apply existing physical real-
izable methods on classifiers to attack re-ID models.
3. System Model
In this section, we first present the threat model and then
introduce the our design objectives.
3.1. Threat Model
Our work focuses on physically realizable attacks
against DNNs based re-ID systems, which capture pedestri-
ans in real-time and automatically search a person of inter-
est across non-overlapping cameras. By comparing the ex-
tracted features of a probe (the queried image) with features
from a set of continuously updated gallery images collected
from other cameras in real time, a re-ID system outputs im-
ages from the gallery which are considered to be the most
similar to the queried image. We choose re-ID system as
our target model because of the wild deployment of deep
re-ID in security-critical settings, which will throw danger-
ous threats if successfully implementing physical-world at-
tacks on re-ID models. For instance, a criminal can easily
escape from the search of re-ID based surveillance systems
by physically deceiving deep re-ID models.
We assume the adversary has white-box access to well-
trained deep re-ID models, so that he has knowledge of
model structure and parameters, and only implements at-
tacks on re-ID models in the inference phase. The adversary
is not allowed to manipulate either the digital queried image
or gallery images gathered from cameras. Moreover, the
adversary is not allowed to change his physical appearance
during attacking re-ID systems in order to avoid arousing
human supervisor’s suspicion. These reasonable assump-
tions make it challenging to realize successfully physical-
world attacks on re-ID systems.
Considering that the stored video recorded by cameras
will be copied and re-ID models will be applied for per-
son search only when something happens, the adversary has
no idea of when he will be treated as the person of inter-
est and which images will be picked for image matching,
which means that the queried image and gallery images are
completely unknown to the adversary. However, with the
white-box access assumption, the adversary is allowed to
construct a generating set X by taking images at each dif-
ferent camera view, which can be realized by stealthily plac-
ing cameras at the same position of surveillance cameras to
capture images before implementing attacks.
3.2. Design Objectives
We propose two attack scenarios, Evading Attack and
Impersonation Attack, to deceive deep-ID models.
Evading Attack. An Evading Attack is an untargeted
attack: Re-ID models are fooled to match the adversary as
an arbitrary person except himself, which looks like that
the adversary wears an “invisible cloak”. Formally, a re-
ID model fθ (·, ·) outputs a similarity score of an image
pair, where θ is the model parameter. Given a probe image
padv of an adversary, and an image gadv belonging to the
adversary in the gallery Gt at time t, we attempt to find
an adversarial pattern δ attached on the adversary’s clothes
to fail deep re-ID models in person search by solving the
following optimization problem:
maxD(δ), s.t. Rank(fθ (padv+δ, gadv+δ)) > K (1)
where D(·) is used to measure the reality of the generated
pattern. Unlike previous works aiming at generating vi-
sually inconspicuous perturbations, we attempt to generate
visible patterns for camera sensing, while making generated
patterns indistinguishable from naturally decorative pattern
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Figure 3. Overview of the attack pipeline.
on clothes. Rank(·) is a sort function which ranks similar-
ity scores of all gallery images with padv in the decreasing
order. An adversarial pattern is successfully crafted only
if the image pair (padv+δ, gadv+δ) ranks behind the top-K
results, which means that the re-ID systems cannot realize
cross-camera image match of the adversary.
Impersonation Attack. An Impersonation Attack is a
targeted attack which can be viewed as an extension of
Evading Attack: The adversary attempts to deceive re-ID
models into mismatching himself as a target person. Given
our target’s image It, we formulate Impersonation Attack
as the following optimization problem:
maxD(δ), s.t.
{
Rank(fθ (padv+δ, gadv+δ)) > K
Rank(fθ (padv+δ, It)) < K
(2)
we can see that, besides the evading constraint, the opti-
mization problem for an Impersonation Attack includes an-
other constraint that the image pair (padv+δ, It) should be
within the top-K results, which implies that the adversary
successfully induces the re-ID systems into matching him
to the target person.
Since the adversary has no knowledge of the queried
image and the gallery, it is impossible for the adversary
to solve the above optimization problems. In the follow-
ing section, we will present the solution that approximately
solve the above optimization problems.
4. Adversarial Pattern Generation
In this section, we present a novel attack algorithm,
called advPattern, to generate adversarial patterns for at-
tacking deep re-ID systems in real-world. Figure 3 shows an
overview of the pipeline to implement an Impersonation At-
tack in physical world. Specifically, we first generate trans-
formable patterns across camera views for attacking the im-
age retrieval problem as described in Section 4.1. To im-
plement position-irrelevant and physical-world attacks, we
further improve the scalability and robustness of adversarial
patterns in Section 4.2 and Section 4.3.
4.1. Transformable Patterns across Camera Views
Existing works [6, 38] found that there exists a common
image style within a certain camera view, while dramatic
variations across different camera views. To ensure that
the same pattern can cause cross-camera image mismatch in
deep re-ID models, we propose an adversarial pattern gener-
ation algorithm to generate transformable patterns that am-
plify the distinction of the adversary’s images across cam-
era views in the process of extracting features of images by
re-ID models.
For the Evading Attack, given the generating set X =
(x1, x2, ..., xm) constructed by the adversary, which con-
sists of the adversary’s images captured from m different
camera views. For each image xi from X , we compute the
adversarial image xi′ = o(xi, Ti(δ)). o(xi, Ti(δ)) denotes
overlaying the corresponding areas of xi after transforma-
tion Ti(·) with the generated pattern δ. Here Ti(δ) is a per-
spective transformation operation of the generated pattern
δ, which ensures the generated pattern to be in accordance
with transformation on person images across camera views.
We generate the transformable adversarial pattern δ by solv-
ing the following optimization problem:
arg min
δ
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fθ(xi
′, xj ′), s.t. i 6= j (3)
We iteratively minimize the similarity scores of images of
an adversary from different cameras to gradually pull far-
ther extracted features of the adversary’s images from dif-
ferent cameras by the generated adversarial pattern.
For the Impersonation Attack, given a target person’s
image It, we optimize the following problem:
arg min
δ
m∑
i=1
m∑
j=1
fθ(xi
′, xj ′)
− α(fθ(xi′, It) + fθ(xj ′, It)), s.t. i 6= j
(4)
where α controls the strength of different objective terms.
By adding the second term in Eq. 4, we additionally max-
imize similarity scores of the adversary’s images with the
target person’s image to generate a more powerful adver-
sarial pattern to pull closer the extracted features of the ad-
versary’s images and the target person’s image.
4.2. Scalable Patterns in Varying Positions
The adversarial patterns should be capable of imple-
menting successful attacks at any position, which means our
attacks should be position-irrelevant. To realize this objec-
tive, we further improve the scalability of the adversarial
pattern in terms of varying positions.
Since we cannot capture the exact distribution of view-
ing transformation, we augment the volume of the generat-
+ T 1 (¥)
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Figure 4. The illustration of how scalable adversarial patterns
work. By adding the generated adversarial pattern, the adversarial
images from the same camera view are clustered together in the
feature space. Meanwhile, the distance of adversarial images from
different cameras becomes farther.
ing set with a multi-position sampling strategy to approxi-
mate the distribution of images for generating scalable ad-
versarial patterns. The augmented generating set XC for
an adversary is built by collecting the adversary’s images
with various distances and angles from each camera view,
and synthesized instances generated by image transforma-
tion such as translation and scaling on original collected im-
ages.
For the Evading Attack, given a triplet trik =<
xok, x
+
k , x
−
k > from X
C , where xok and x
+
k are person im-
ages from the same camera, while x−k is the person image
from a different camera, for each image xk from trik, we
compute the adversarial image xk′ as o(xk, Tk(δ)). We ran-
domly chose a triplet at each iteration for solving the fol-
lowing optimization problem:
arg min
δ
E
trik∼XC
fθ((x
o
k)
′, (x−k )
′)− βfθ((xok)′, (x+k )′)
(5)
where β is a hyperparameter that balances different objec-
tives during optimization. The objective of Eq.(5) is to
minimize the similarity scores of xok with x
−
k to discrimi-
nate person images across camera views, while maximiz-
ing similarity scores of xok with x
+
k to preserve the simi-
larity of person images from the same camera view. Dur-
ing optimization the generated pattern learns the scalability
from the augmented generating set XC to pull closer the
extracted features of person images from the same camera,
while pushing features from different cameras farther, as
shown in Figure 4.
For the Impersonation Attack, given an image set
It of the target person, and a quadruplet quadk =<
xok, x
+
k , x
−
k , tk > consisting of a triplet trik and a person
image tk from It, we randomly choose a quadruplet at each
iteration, and iteratively solve the following optimization
problem:
arg max
δ
E
quadk∼{XC,It}
fθ((x
o
k)
′, tk)
+ λ1fθ((x
o
k)
′, (x+k )
′)− λ2fθ((xok)′, (x−k )′)
(6)
where λ1 and λ2 are hyperparameters that control the
strength of different objectives. We add an additional ob-
jective that maximizes the similarity score of xok with tk to
pull closer the extracted features of the adversary’s images
to the features of the target person’s images.
4.3. Robust Patterns for Physically Realizable At-
tack
Our goal is to implement physically realizable attacks
on deep re-ID systems by generating physically robust pat-
terns on adversaries’ clothes. To ensure adversarial patterns
to be perceived by cameras, we generate large magnitude
of patterns with no constraints over them during optimiza-
tion. However, introducing conspicuous patterns will in
turn make adversaries be attractive and arouse suspicion of
human supervisors.
To tackle this problem, we design unobtrusive adversar-
ial patterns which are visible but difficult for humans to dis-
tinguish them from the decorative patterns on clothes. To be
specific, we choose a maskMx to project the generated pat-
tern to a shape that looks like a decorative pattern on clothes
(e.g., commonplace logos or creative graffiti). In addition,
to generate smooth and consistent patches in our pattern, in
other words, colors change only gradually within patches,
we follow Sharif et al. [25] that adds total variation (TV )
[21] into the objective function:
TV (δ) =
∑
p,q
((δp,q − δp+1,q)2 + (δp,q − δp,q+1)2)
1
2 (7)
where δp,q is a pixel value of the pattern δ at coordinates
(p, q), and TV (δ) is high when there are large variations in
the values of adjacent pixels, and low otherwise. By mini-
mizing TV (δ), the values of adjacent pixels are encouraged
to be closer to each other to improve the smoothness of the
generated pattern.
Implementing physical-world attacks on deep re-ID sys-
tems requires adversarial patterns to survive in various en-
vironmental conditions. To deal with this problem, we de-
sign a degradation function ϕ(·) that randomly changes the
brightness or blurs the adversary’s images from the aug-
mented generating set XC . During optimization we re-
place xi with the degraded image ϕ(xi) to improve the ro-
bustness of our generated pattern against physical dynamics
and shooting distortion. Recently, the non-printability score
(NPS) was utilized in [8, 25] to account for printing error.
We introduce NPS into our objective function but find it
hard to balance NPS term with other objectives. Alterna-
tively, we constrain the search space of the generated pat-
tern δ in a narrower interval P to avoid unprintable colors
(e.g., high brightness and high saturation). Thus, for each
image xk from trik, we use o(xk, Tk(Mx · δ)) to compute
the adversarial images xk′, and generate robust adversarial
patterns to implement physical-world attack as solving the
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Figure 5. The scene setting of physical-world tests. We choose
14 testing points under each camera which vary in distances and
angles.
following optimization problem:
arg min
δ
E
trik∼XC
fθ(ϕ(x
o
k)
′, ϕ(x−k )
′)
− βfθ(ϕ(xok)′, ϕ(x+k )′) + κ · TV (δ), s.t. δ ∈ P
(8)
where λ and κ are hyperparameters that control the strength
of different objectives. Similarly, the formulation of the Im-
personation Attack is analogous to that of the Evading At-
tack, which is as follows:
arg max
δ
E
quadk∼{XC,It}
fθ(ϕ(x
o
k)
′, tk)
+ λ1fθ(ϕ(x
o
k)
′, ϕ(x+k )
′)− λ2fθ(ϕ(xok)′, ϕ(x−k )′)
+ κ · TV (δ), s.t. δ ∈ P
(9)
Finally, we print the generated pattern over the the adver-
sary’s clothes to deceive re-ID into mismatching him as an
arbitrary person or a target person.
5. Experiments
In this section, we first introduce the datasets and the tar-
get deep re-ID models used for evaluation in Section 5.1.
We evaluate the proposed advPattern for attacking deep re-
ID tools both under digital environment (Section 5.2) and in
physical world (Section 5.3). We finally discuss the impli-
cations and limitations of advPattern in Section 5.4.
5.1. Datasets and re-ID Models
Market1501 Dataset. Market1501 contains 32,668 an-
notated bounding boxes of 1501 identities, which is divided
into two non-overlapping subsets: the training dataset con-
tains 12,936 cropped images of 751 identities, while the
testing set contains 19,732 cropped images of 750 identi-
ties.
PRCS Dataset. We built a Person Re-identification in
Campus Streets (PRCS) dataset for evaluating the attack
method. PRCS contains 10,800 cropped images of 30 iden-
tities. During dataset collection, three cameras were de-
ployed to capture pedestrians in different campus streets.
Each identity in PRCS was captured by both three cameras
and has at least 100 cropped images per camera. We chose
Table 1. Re-ID performance of model A and model B on Mar-
ket1501 and PRCS datasets. (ss = Similarity Score)
Model Dataset rank-1 rank-5 rank-10 mAP ss
A Market-1501 77.8% 90.2% 93.5% 62.7% 0.796PRCS 87.9% 93.4% 100.0% 78.6% 0.876
B Market-1501 74.5% 89.0% 92.8% 57.3% 0.732PRCS 84.7% 95.4% 99.0% 77.2% 0.857
Table 2. Digital-environment attack results on model A and model
B under Evading Attack (GS = Generating Set, TS = Testing Set).
Model Dataset rank-1 rank-5 rank-10 mAP ss
A GS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.4% 0.394TS 4.2% 8.3% 16.7% 7.3% 0.479
B GS 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.5% 0.422TS 10.4% 13.3% 16.7% 16.3% 0.508
30 images of each identity per camera to construct the test-
ing dataset for evaluating the performance of the trained re-
ID models and our attack method.
Target Re-ID Models. We evaluated the proposed at-
tack method on two different types of deep re-ID models:
model A is a siamese network proposed by Zheng et al.
[37], which is trained by combining verification loss and
identification loss; model B utilizes a classification model
to learn the discriminative embeddings of identities as intro-
duced in [36]. The reason why we choose the two models
as target models is that classification networks and siamese
networks are widely used in the re-ID community. The
effectiveness of our attacks on the two models can imply
the effectiveness on other models. Both of the two models
achieve the state-of-the-art performance (i.e., rank-k accu-
racy and mAP) on Market1501 dataset, and also work well
on PRCS dataset. The results are given in Table 1.
We use the ADAM optimizer to generate adversarial pat-
terns with the following parameters setting: learning rate
= 0.01, β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999. We set the maximum num-
ber of iterations to 700.
5.2. Digital-Environment Tests
We first evaluate our attack method in digital domain
where the adversary’s images are directly modified by digi-
tal adversarial patterns†. It is worth noting that attacking in
digital domain is actually not a realistic attack, but a neces-
sary evaluation step before successfully implementing real
physical-world attacks.
Experiment Setup. We first craft the adversarial pattern
over a generating set for each adversary, which consists of
real images from varying positions, viewing angles and syn-
thesized samples. Then we attach generated adversarial pat-
tern to the adversary’s images in digital domain to evaluate
the attacking performance on the target re-ID models.
†The code is avaliable at https://github.com/whuAdv/
AdvPattern
Table 3. Digital-environment attack results on target models under Impersonation Attack. The performance of matching the adversary as
the target person (Target) and himself (Adversary) are both given. (GS = Generating Set, TS = Testing Set).
PRCS Market1501Model Matched person rank-1 rank-5 rank-10 mAP ss rank-1 rank-5 rank-10 mAP ss
Target(GS) 86.7% 97.2% 100.0% 89.7% 0.848 68.0% 83.8% 89.8% 70.7% 0.814A Adversary(GS) 5.50% 5.70% 8.30% 8.10% 0.524 4.10% 4.10% 10.4% 9.20% 0.565
Target(GS) 92.8% 97.7% 100.0% 91.8% 0.858 94.0% 98.1% 100.0% 60.7% 0.775B Adversary(GS) 2.50% 5.80% 8.40% 5.50% 0.486 1.80% 6.90% 8.70% 10.9% 0.606
Target(TS) 74.4% 83.3% 91.7% 81.5% 0.824% 55.8% 70.8% 79.2% 45.1% 0.803A Adversary(TS) 19.4% 22.2% 38.9% 18.4% 0.633 14.1% 17.1% 27.5% 12.9% 0.638
Target(TS) 78.4% 83.3% 91.7% 88.2% 0.812 68.7% 79.2% 91.6% 51.9% 0.749B Adversary(TS) 16.7% 18.9% 41.7% 24.8% 0.652 28.4% 34.7% 50.4% 31.3% 0.659
Table 4. Physical-world attack results on target models at varying distances and angles. Distance&Angle of each points with camera 3 are
given. ∆rank-1,∆mAP and∆ss indicate the drop of target models’ performance due to adversarial patterns.
Evading Attack Impersonation AttackDistance&Angle rank-1 ∆rank-1 mAP ∆mAP ss ∆ss rank-1 mAP ss
P1 (4.39, 24.2) 0.00% 100% 18.9% 69.2% 0.689 0.146 40.0% 58.4% 0.774
P2 (5.31, 19.8) 20.0% 80.0% 25.6% 66.5% 0.694 0.149 80.0% 83.8% 0.746
P3 (6.26, 16.7) 20.0% 80.0% 24.6% 66.7% 0.687 0.163 0.0% 33.6% 0.728
P4 (7.23, 14.4) 20.0% 80.0% 21.1% 68.9% 0.680 0.180 80.0% 84.9% 0.737
P5 (8.20, 12.7) 20.0% 80.0% 23.4% 64.2% 0.660 0.124 20.0% 58.4% 0.748
P6 (5.38, 42.0) 0.00% 100% 18.6% 71.2% 0.685 0.192 40.0% 68.0% 0.784
P7 (6.16, 35.8) 40.0% 60.0% 27.6% 62.7% 0.709 0.164 40.0% 65.2% 0.761
P8 (7.00, 31.0) 0.00% 100% 15.9% 40.8% 0.663 0.083 80.0% 85.8% 0.762
P9 (7.87, 27.2) 0.0% 100% 18.0% 71.6% 0.669 0.158 40.0% 67.1% 0.767
P10 (8.77, 24.2) 40.0% 60.0% 40.0% 57.5% 0.714 0.167 40.0% 59.5% 0.761
P11 (7.36, 47.2) 20.0% 80.0% 22.6% 65.6% 0.695 0.147 60.0% 72.1% 0.768
P12 (8.07, 42.0) 60.0% 40.0% 27.6% 47.6% 0.688 0.124 80.0% 82.3% 0.771
P13 (8.84, 37.6) 80.0% 20.0% 47.5% 36.8% 0.749 0.071 40.0% 78.3% 0.789
P14 (9.65, 34.0) 40.0% 60.0% 20.9% 66.7% 0.699 0.148 20.0% 52.6% 0.768
Average 27.1% 74.3% 25.2% 61.1% 0.692 0.144 47.1% 67.9% 0.762
We choose every identity from PRCS as an adversary
to attack deep re-ID. In each query, we choose an image
from adversarial images as the probe image, and construct
a gallery by combining 12 adversarial images from other
cameras with images from 29 identities in PRCS, and 750
identities in Market1501. For Impersonation Attack, we
take two identities as target for each adversary: one is ran-
domly chosen from Market1501, and another one is chosen
from PRCS. We ran 100 queries for each attack.
Experiment Results. Table 2 shows the attack results on
two re-ID models under Evading Attack in digital environ-
ment. We can see that the matching probability and mAP
drops significantly for both re-ID models, which demon-
strate the high success rate of implementing the Evading
Attack. The similarity score of the adversary’s images de-
creases to less than 0.5, making it hard for deep re-ID mod-
els to correctly match images of the adversary in the large
gallery. Note that the attack performance on testing set is
close to generating set, e.g., rank-1 accuracy from 4.2% to
0% and mAP from 7.3% to 4.4%, which demonstrates the
scalability of the digital adversarial patterns when imple-
menting attacks with unseen images.
Table 3 shows the attack results to two re-ID models un-
der Impersonation Attack in the digital environment. In
PRCS, the average rank-1 accuracy is above 85% when
matching adversarial images from the generating set as a
target person, which demonstrates the effectiveness of im-
plementing the targeted attack. The patterns are less effec-
tive when targeting an identity from Market1501: the rank-1
accuracy of model A decreases to 68.0% for the generating
set, and 41.7% for the testing set. We attribute it to the large
variations in physical appearance and image styles between
two datasets. Though, the high rank-5 accuracy and mAP
demonstrate the strong capability of digital patterns to de-
ceive target models. Note that the rank-k accuracy and mAP
decrease significantly for matching the adversary’s images
across cameras, which means that the generated patterns
can also cause mismatch across camera views in targeted
attacks. Again, that the attack performance on testing set
is close to generating set demonstrates the scalability of the
adversarial patterns with unseen images.
5.3. Physical-World Evaluation
On the basis of digital-environment tests, we further
evaluate our attack method in physical world. We print the
adversarial pattern and attach it to the adversary’s clothes
for implementing physical-world attacks.
Experiment Setup. The scene setting of physical-world
tests is shown in Figure 5, where we take images of the
adversary with/without the adversarial pattern in 14 testing
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Figure 6. Examples of physically realizable attacks. Top row: an
Evading Attack (the adversary: ID1 from PRCS). Middle row: an
Impersonation Attack targeting identity from PRCS (the adver-
sary: ID2 in PRCS, the target: ID12 from PRCS). Bottom row:
an Impersonation Attack targeting identity from Market1501 (the
adversary: ID3 in PRCS, the target: ID728 from Market1501)
points with variations in distances and angles from cameras.
These 14 points are sampled with a fix interval in the filed of
cameras views. We omit the left-top point in our experiment
due to the constraint of shooting conditions. The distance
between cameras and the adversary is about from 5m to
10m for better perceiving the adversarial pattern.
We choose 5 identities as adversaries from PRCS to
implement physically realizable attacks. In each query,
we randomly choose the adversary’s image under a test-
ing point as the probe image, while adding 12 adversarial
images from other cameras into the gallery. Two identities
are randomly chosen from Market1501 and PRCS respec-
tively to serve as target person. 100 queries for each testing
point are performed. We evaluate physical-world attacks for
Evading Attack with model A, while Impersonation Attack
with model B.
Experiment Results. Table 4 shows the physical-world
attack results of 14 different testing positions with varying
distances and angles from cameras. Note that ∆rank-1 de-
notes the drop of match probability due to adversarial pat-
terns. Similar meanings happen to ∆mAP and ∆ss. For the
Evading Attack, we can see that it significantly decreases
the match probability to the adversary with the crafted ad-
versarial pattern. The average ∆rank-1 and ∆mAP are
62.2% and 61.1%. The average of the rank-1 accuracy and
mAP are 47.1% and 67.9% under Impersonation Attack,
respectively. The results demonstrates the effectiveness of
adversarial patterns to implement physical-world attacks in
varying positions with considerable success rate.
For Evading Attack, the average rank-1 accuracy drops
to 11.1% in 9 of 14 positions, which demonstrates that the
generated adversarial patterns can physically attack deep re-
ID systems with high success rate. Note that adversarial
patterns are less effective in some testing points, e.g., P12
and P13. We attribute it to the larger angles and farther
distance between these points and cameras, which makes it
more difficult for cameras to perceive the patterns. For Im-
personation Attack, The rank-1 accuracy for matching the
adversary as the target person is 56.4% in 11 of 14 positions
, which is close to the result of digital patterns targeting
on Market1501. The high mAP and similarity scores when
matching the adversary as the targeted person demonstrate
the effectiveness of adversarial patterns to implement tar-
geted attack in physical world. Still, there exists few points
(P3, P5, P14) where the adversary has trouble to implement
successful attack with adversarial patterns. Figure 6 shows
examples of physical-world attacks on deep re-ID systems.
5.4. Discussion
Black Box Attacks. In this paper, we start with the
white-box assumption to investigate the vulnerability of
deep re-IDs models. Nevertheless, it would be more mean-
ingful if we can realize adversarial patterns with black-box
setting. Prior works [19, 23] demonstrated successful at-
tacks without any knowledge of model’s internals by uti-
lizing the transferability of adversarial examples. We will
leave black-box attacks as our future work.
AdvPattern vs. Other Approaches. AdvPattern allows
the adversary to deceive deep re-ID systems without any
digital modifications of person images or any physical ap-
pearance change. Although there are simpler ways to attack
re-ID systems, e.g., directly object removal in digital do-
main, or changing physical appearance in different camera
view, we argue that our adversarial pattern is the most rea-
sonable method because: (1) for object removal methods, it
is unrealistic to control the queried image and gallery im-
ages; (2) changing physical appearance makes adversaries
attractive to human supervisors.
6. Conclusion
This paper designed Evading Attack and Impersonation
Attack for deep re-ID systems, and proposed advPattern
for generating adversarially transformable patterns to real-
ize adversary mismatch and target person impersonation in
physical world. The extensive evaluations demonstrate the
vulnerability of deep re-ID systems to our attacks.
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